TL;DR: Post-Quantum Cryptography Report (July 2024)

PQC Report

Quick review of the Office of Management and Budget Post-Quantum Cryptography Report

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) just dropped this report because:

  • Quantum computers might soon crack today’s cryptography like a walnut.
  • The Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act (Jan 2023) required them do it.

The report lays out some truths that should be self-evident:

  • A comprehensive and ongoing cryptographic inventory is essential for a successful migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC).
  • The threat of “record-now-decrypt-later” attacks means we need to start PQC migration well before a quantum computer capable of breaking current encryption is operational.
  • Agencies must prioritize which systems and data need PQC migration first.
  • Systems that can’t support PQC algorithms need to be identified as early as possible.

The "strategy", for UA government agencies feels more like guidance - here are the highlights:

  • Keep a thorough, ongoing cryptographic inventory—it’s the foundation for successful PQC migration.
  • Start migrating to PQC before a quantum computer (CRQC) breaks current encryption (because "record-now-decrypt-later" is a real threat).
  • Prioritize which systems and data need PQC first.
  • Identify systems that won’t support PQC algorithms early on.

Goal: Migrate prioritized information systems to PQC between 2025 and 2035.
Estimated Cost: $7.1 billion

NIST to the Rescue: They’re already crafting the next-gen algorithms to keep us secure.

Questions:

  • When, if ever, will cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) become reality?
  • When does the private sector need to start mitigating PQC risk?"
  • Which industries are the most at risk (seems like Critical Infrastructure Sectors)?
  • Prioritize which systems and data need PQC first.
  • Identify systems that won’t support PQC algorithms early on.

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